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Abstract
Many proper scoring rules such as the Brier and log scoring rules
implicitly reward a probability forecaster relative to a uniform base-
line distribution. Recent work has motivated weighted proper scoring
rules, which have an additional baseline parameter. To date two fami-
lies of weighted proper scoring rules have been introduced, the weighted
power and pseudospherical scoring families. These families are com-
patible with the log scoring rule: when the baseline maximizes the log
scoring rule over some set of distributions, the baseline also maximizes
the weighted power and pseudospherical scoring rules over the same
set. We characterize all weighted proper scoring families and prove a
general property: every proper scoring rule is compatible with some
weighted scoring family, and every weighted scoring family is compat-
ible with some proper scoring rule.
1 Introduction
Suppose Y is a random variable taking values in {1, . . . ,m}. The valid
distributions for Y are
P = {(p1, . . . , pm)
T : 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1,
m∑
i=1
pi = 1} ⊂ R
m.
∗This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for
publication in Biometrika following peer review. The definitive publisher-
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A scoring rule s : P × P → R is a function linear in its second argument.
The scoring rule is proper if s(p, r) is maximized over p at p = r, and strictly
proper if this maximum is unique.
Consider a forecaster asked to issue a probabilistic prediction p for Y .
She is motivated by a reward of s(p, r) upon observing outcome distribution
r. If the forecaster’s true belief is p∗, her expected score s(p, p∗) is maximized
when she predicts p = p∗. Hence proper scoring rules encourage honesty.
Two scoring rules equivalent if their rewards are linearly related for all
p, r ∈ P:
s1(p, r) = a{s2(p, r) + 〈b , r〉} (1)
where 〈· , ·〉 is the standard inner product on Rm, a > 0 and b ∈ Rm.
The main characterization theorem for proper scoring rules was stated
by McCarthy (1956) and proved by Hendrickson and Buehler (1971).
Theorem 1. A scoring rule s is proper if and only if the function
S(λp) = λs(p, p) (2)
defined on PΛ = {λp : λ > 0, p ∈ P} is convex and satisfies S(p) ≥ s(p, q)
for all p, q ∈ P. The scoring rule is strictly proper if and only if S is strictly
convex on P.
The function S is called the optimal expected score. Gru¨nwald and Dawid
(2004) showed that the negative optimal expected score can be interpreted
as a generalized entropy.
When S is differentiable we have (Hendrickson and Buehler, 1971)
s(p, r) = s(λp, r) = 〈∇λpS(λp) , r〉 (3)
which associates a proper scoring rule with any convex differentiable function
S. For the rest of this paper we assume that S is twice differentiable on PΛ,
strictly convex on P, and achieves its unique minimum in P+, the interior
of P.
Equation (3) extends the domain of s to PΛ×P and allows us to differ-
entiate s with respect to its first parameter. Since s(λp, r) = s(p, r) for any
λ > 0, we have 〈∇ps(p, r) , 1m〉 = 0 for any p and r ∈ P, where 1m ∈ R
m
has all entries equal to one.
Consider a sequence of observations y1, . . . , yn with empirical distribu-
tion r ∈ P. Let p(θ) be some model which takes values in P+ and is
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differentiable over some open convex set Θ. Then any scoring rule defines
an optimal score estimator (Gneiting and Raftery, 2007) via
θ˜(r) = argmax
θ∈Θ
s{p(θ), r} = argmax
θ∈Θ
n∑
i=1
s{p(θ), yi}.
From (1), all equivalent scoring rules have the same optimal score estimator.
The optimal score estimator is well behaved at r if θ˜(r) exists and is the
unique root of ∇θs{p(θ), r} in Θ. When s is the log scoring rule s(p, r) =∑m
i=1 ri log pi, the optimal score estimator becomes the maximum likelihood
estimator.
A well behaved optimal score estimate θ˜(r) yields the parameter choice
that maximizes the forecaster’s expected score under the assumption that
the future is similar to the past. Specifically we suppose that our forecaster
issues the prediction p(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ. If she believes that the next
observation’s distribution is r, then p{θ˜(r)} maximizes her expected score.
The optimal score estimator can be generalized so that each yi follows
a different probability distribution, as long as these distributions share a
common parameter θ ∈ Θ. Thus the optimal score estimator is applicable
to regression models that depend on both θ and some additional covariates.
For the sake of brevity we consider only the basic optimal score estimator
here, though all the results hold in the general case.
2 Results
We define the baseline of a strictly proper scoring rule to be the unique
q ∈ P+ that maximizes the generalized entropy −S(p). For example, the
log scoring rule’s generalized entropy is the Shannon entropy, which is max-
imized by the uniform distribution. Proper scoring rules tends to give larger
rewards for riskier predictions which vary significantly from the baseline.
Given q ∈ P+ and a strictly proper scoring rule s(p, r), there is an equiva-
lent rule with baseline q given by s(p, r)− s(q, r).
A weighted scoring family
s (p, r ‖ ·) = {s (p, r ‖ q) : q ∈ P+}
is a family of strictly proper scoring rules where each member s (p, r ‖ q)
has baseline q. Two weighted proper scoring rules are equivalent if (1) is
satisfied, where now a and b are functions of q. Different members from the
same family need not be equivalent.
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Weighted scoring families allow us to tailor our scoring rule to the prob-
lem at hand, as motivated in Jose et al. (2009) and Johnstone and Lin (2011).
This tailoring is achieved by modifying the baseline. The baseline is eas-
ily interpretable and justifiable in many real world situations. For instance,
weighted scoring families are used in Jose et al. (2008) for a optimal portfolio
allocation problem, where the baseline corresponds to the market price.
Let s(p, r) be a proper scoring rule and s (p, r ‖ ·) be a weighted scoring
family. We say s (p, r ‖ ·) is compatible with s(p, r) if for any q and r ∈ P+,
∇ps(p, r)|p=q = a(q)∇ps (p, r ‖ q)|p=q (4)
for some function a(q) > 0. In words, equation (4) says that the tangent of
a weighted scoring rule at its baseline q is parallel to the compatible scoring
rule’s tangent at q. By approximating s (p, r ‖ q) with its tangent at p = q
and applying (4), we obtain
s (p, r ‖ q) ≈ s (q, r ‖ q) +
1
a(q)
〈
∇ps(p, r)|p=q , p− q
〉
.
The first term corresponds to an equivalence factor 〈b(q) , r〉. Thus, up
to equivalence, every member of the weighted scoring family s (p, r ‖ ·) is
linearly approximated by the compatible proper scoring rule s(p, r) in the
vicinity of its baseline.
Theorem 2. Any proper scoring rule is compatible with at least one weighted
scoring family. Conversely, every weighted scoring family is compatible with
some proper scoring rule, which is unique up to equivalence.
Proof. Let s(p, r) be a proper scoring rule. From the definition (4), it is com-
patible with the weighted scoring family where each member is equivalent
to s(p, r):
s (p, r ‖ q) = s(p, r)− s(q, r).
Conversely, consider the weighted scoring family s (p, r ‖ ·). From (3) and
(4), a proper scoring rule s(p, r) is compatible with this family if and only
if its optimal expected score S(p) satisfies
∇2qS(q) = a(q) ∇
2
pS (p ‖ q)
∣∣
p=q
(5)
for some a(q) > 0 and all q ∈ P+. The right hand side is a positive definite
matrix since it is the Hessian of the convex function S (p ‖ q). Thus the
S satisfying (5) is convex and corresponds to a strictly proper scoring rule.
This solution is unique up to equivalence since the solution of a second-order
differential equation is unique up to a linear term.
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Having shown that a compatible proper scoring rule always exists, we
now provide an alternative characterization for compatibility which has di-
rect applications to optimal score estimation and decision theory.
Lemma 1. A weighted scoring family s (p, r ‖ ·) is compatible with the
proper scoring rule s(p, r) if and only if ∇θs{p(θ), r}|θ=θ0 = 0 implies
∇θs{p(θ), r ‖ p(θ0}|θ=θ0 = 0 for all differentiable models p(θ), all θ0 ∈ Θ,
and all r ∈ P+.
Proof. Choose some model p(θ) and r ∈ P+. Suppose that s (p, r ‖ ·) is
compatible with s(p, r), so that (4) holds for all q ∈ P+. Then (4) certainly
holds when q = p(θ0) for any θ0 ∈ Θ. Left multiplying both sides of (4)
with the matrix ∇θp
T (θ)
∣∣
θ=θ0
and using the chain rule,
∇θs{p(θ), r}|θ=θ0 = a{p(θ0)} ∇θs{p(θ), r ‖ p(θ0)}|θ=θ0 .
Thus if ∇θs{p(θ), r}|θ=θ0 = 0 then ∇θs{p(θ), r ‖ p(θ0)}|θ=θ0 = 0.
Conversely, suppose ∇θs{p(θ), r}|θ=θ0 = 0 implies ∇θs{p(θ), r ‖ p(θ0)}|θ=θ0 =
0. When q = r, both sides of (4) are being evaluated at their critical points
and hence are zero. We will show (4) holds for q 6= r by showing that
v = ∇ps (p, r ‖ q)|p=q is parallel to w = ∇ps(p, r)|p=q. Using (3) we can
rewrite v as
v = ∇2pS (p ‖ q)
∣∣
p=q
r (6)
where ∇2pS (p ‖ q) is the positive definite Hessian of S (p ‖ q). This implies
v 6= 0 since r 6= 0. Furthermore since v is a gradient of s (p, r ‖ q), 〈v , 1m〉 =
0. The same arguments show that w 6= 0 and 〈w , 1m〉 = 0.
Suppose v is not parallel to w. Then we can define the non-zero vector
b = v −
〈v , w〉
〈w , w〉
w. (7)
By construction 〈b , w〉 = 0. Consider the model p(θ) = q + θb where θ
takes values on Θ, an open neighbourhood of zero small enough such that
{p(θ) : θ ∈ Θ} ⊂ P+. It follows from 〈v , 1m〉 = 0 and 〈w , 1m〉 = 0 that
p(θ) is normalized for all θ ∈ Θ. Thus p(θ) is a valid distribution for θ ∈ Θ
and, by our choice of w and p(θ),
∇θs{p(θ), r}|θ=0 = 〈∇θp(θ)|θ=0 , w〉 = 〈b , w〉 = 0.
Hence by assumption, ∇θs{p(θ), r ‖ q}|θ=0 = 0. By definition of v we have
∇θs{p(θ), r ‖ q}|θ=0 = 〈b , v〉 and thus 〈b , v〉 = 0. Substituting this into (7),
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〈v , v〉 〈w , w〉 = 〈v , w〉2 and the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality implies that v
is parallel to w: w = a(r, q)v. Using (6), we rewrite w = a(r, q)v as
∇2pS (p ‖ q)
∣∣
p=q
r = a(q, r) ∇2pS(p)
∣∣
p=q
r.
Since both matrices are positive definite, a(q, r) > 0. Since the left hand
side is linear in r, we see a = a(q), which proves (4).
Consider a forecaster motivated by a weighted scoring rule with baseline
q to issue a prediction p(θ) for Y . She chooses her prediction based on some
decision rule p{θ˘(r)}, where r is the empirical distribution of the previous
observations of Y . For instance, θ˘ could be the optimal score estimator for
her weighted scoring rule. Her risk function is −s[p{θ˘(p∗)}, p∗ ‖ q], which
depends on the unknown true distribution p∗ of Y . Since p∗ is unknown it
is approximated with the empirical distribution r.
Suppose the baseline is determined by the optimal score estimator of the
compatible scoring rule, q = p{θ˜(r)}. Then, assuming θ˘ and θ˜ to be well
behaved at r, Lemma 1 implies that the forecaster’s risk function is uniquely
minimized when she issues the prediction q. The optimal score estimator of
the compatible scoring rule dominates any other estimator θ˘ for this choice
of baseline.
3 Examples
Define the quasi-Bregman weighted scoring families to be the proper scoring
rules with optimal expected scores
S (p ‖ q) = h
{
m∑
i=1
f(qi)g
(
pi
qi
)}
− g′(1)
m∑
i=1
pif(qi)
qi
h′

g(1)
m∑
j=1
f(qj)

 ,
(8)
where g′ denotes the derivative of g with respect to its parameter, and
similarly for h′. We require that f is positive, g is twice differentiable and
strictly convex, and that h is twice differentiable and strictly increasing.
This defines a weighted scoring family for each choice of f , g and h. The
expected score S (p ‖ q) is strictly convex since g is strictly convex, f is
positive and h is increasing. Hence the quasi-Bregman weighted scoring
families are strictly proper. The second term of (8) ensures that S (p ‖ q)
has baseline q, though removing it achieve a simpler, equivalent rule for
optimal score estimation.
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The weighted power and pseudospherical scoring families of Jose et al.
(2008), defined by
spow (p, r ‖ q) =
1−
∑m
i=1 p
β
i q
1−β
i
β
−
1−
∑m
i=1 rip
β−1
i q
1−β
i
β − 1
,
sps (p, r ‖ q) =
1
β − 1


∑m
i=1 ripi/qi(∑m
i=1 p
β
i q
1−β
i
)1/β − 1


for β > 1, are quasi-Bregman weighted scoring families with f(x) = x and
hpow(x) =
x− 1
β(β − 1)
, gpow(x) = xβ, hps(x) =
x1/β − 1
β(β − 1)
, gps(x) = xβ.
Johnstone and Lin (2011) proved that ∇θs{p(θ), r}|θ=θ0 = 0 implies
∇θs{p(θ), r ‖ p(θ0}|θ=θ0 = 0
when s (p, r ‖ r) is a power or pseudospherical weighted scoring family and
s(p, r) is the log scoring rule. From Lemma 1, this is equivalent to showing
that the power and pseudospherical weighted scoring families are compatible
with the log scoring rule.
Corollary 1. The log scoring rule is compatible with any quasi-Bregman
weighted scoring family with f(x) = x. This holds for any twice differentiable
and strictly convex g, and any twice differentiable and strictly increasing h.
Proof. By substituting f(x) = x into (8) and using (3), we obtain
s (p, r ‖ q) = h′
{
m∑
i=1
qig
(
pi
qi
)} m∑
j=1
rjg
′
(
pj
qj
)
. (9)
The log scoring rule is s(p, r) =
∑m
i=1 ri log pi. Substituting (9) and the log
scoring rule into (4) shows that the equality holds with a = h′ {g(1)} g′(1).
The functions h and g enter only through their values and first derivatives
at 1.
We define the Bregman weighted scoring families as the quasi-Bregman
weighted scoring families with h(x) = x. By substituting (8) into (3) and
using equivalence, the Bregman weighted scoring families take the simple
form
s (p, r ‖ q) =
m∑
i=1
f(qi)
{
g
(
pi
qi
)
+ g′
(
pi
qi
)
ri − pi
qi
}
. (10)
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We recover the unweighted Bregman scoring rules of Gru¨nwald and Dawid
(2004), i.e.,
s(p, r) =
m∑
i=1
{
g˜(pi) + g˜
′(pi)(ri − pi)
}
, (11)
by using a flat baseline and rescaling g to g˜(pi) = f(qi)g(pi/qi) = f(m
−1)g(mpi).
The unweighted Bregman scoring rules are uniquely specified through the
convex function g˜ alone.
Corollary 2. The unweighted Bregman rule specified by g˜ is compatible with
all weighted Bregman families with f(x) = x2g˜′′(x). This holds for any twice
differentiable and strictly convex g.
Proof. We use (4) with s (p, r ‖ q) given by (10) with f(x) = x2g˜′′(x) and
s(p, r) given by (11).
We illustrate the use of this corollary via an example. The unweighted
power scoring rule is defined by g˜(x) = xβ/{β(β − 1)} for β > 1. Using the
above corollary with f(x) = xβ, we see that the unweighted power scoring
rule is compatible with all weighted scoring families of the form
s (p, r ‖ q) =
m∑
i=1
qβi
{
g
(
pi
qi
)
+ g′
(
pi
qi
)
ri − pi
qi
}
(12)
for any choice of g.
4 Discussion
As an application of compatible proper scoring rules, consider a portfolio
allocation problem similar to Jose et al. (2008). There is a market con-
sisting of m assets, and a market maker who sets the prices at q. After
one time period asset Y will be worth 1 unit and the other assets will be
worthless. The investor purchases a portfolio, spending a proportion of his
wealth pi(θ) on each asset and thus receiving pi(θ)/qi(θ) units of each as-
set. He chooses θ based on the current prices q and the historical outcome
distribution r. Suppose the investor’s negative risk is given by a weighted
scoring rule s{p(θ), r ‖ q}. The market maker does not know the form of
the investor’s scoring rule, but he believes it to come from a weighted scor-
ing family compatible with some known proper scoring rule. The market
maker prices the assets using the compatible rule’s optimal score estimator,
q = p{θ˜(r)}. Then the market maker’s price coincides with the investor’s
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minimal risk portfolio p(θ): when the pricing is done by a compatible proper
scoring rule, the investor is best served by buying the same number of units
of each asset. Johnstone (2011) interprets this minimal risk portfolio from
an economic perspective, for the special case where the compatible rule is
the log score.
Until now, the only weighted scoring families considered in the litera-
ture were the weighted power and pseudospherical scoring rules. Since both
are compatible with the log scoring rule, their optimal score estimators are
dominated by the maximum likelihood estimator when the baseline is given
by the latter. Johnstone and Lin (2011) conjectured the existence of a char-
acterization theorem for all weighted proper scoring families whose optimal
score estimators are dominated in this way. They went on to suggest that
this theorem might reveal an unrecognized property of the log scoring rule.
We have found their conjectured characterization theorem: the optimal
score estimator of any weighted proper scoring rule is dominated by the
compatible proper scoring rule’s optimal score estimator when the baseline is
set to the compatible proper scoring rule’s optimal score estimate. However,
instead of revealing a special property of the log scoring rule, we have shown
that every proper scoring rule is compatible with some family of weighted
proper scoring rules.
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